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Abstract
We have published several articles about generalizations and boundary-case
exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem during the last 25 years.
The current paper will review some of our prior results and also introduce
an “enriched” refinement of semantic tableaux deduction. While the Second
Incompleteness Theorem is a strong result, we will emphasize its boundary-
case exceptions are germane to Global Warming’s threat because our systems
can own a simultaneous knowledge about their own consistency, together with
an understanding of the Π1 implications of Peano Arithmetic.
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1 Introduction
The existence of a deep chasm between the goals of Hilbert’s consistency program and
the implications of Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem was immediately apparent
when Go¨del announced his famous millennial discovery [19].
Interestingly, neither Go¨del (in 1931) nor Hilbert (during the remainder of his life)
dismissed the existence of possible compromise solutions, whereby a fragment of the goals
of the Consistency Program could remain intact. For instance, Hilbert never withdrew
his statement ∗ for justifying his Consistency Program in [27]:
∗ “ Let us admit that the situation in which we presently find ourselves with respect
to paradoxes is in the long run intolerable. Just think: in mathematics, this paragon
of reliability and truth, the very notions and inferences, as everyone learns, teaches,
and uses them, lead to absurdities. And where else would reliability and truth be
found if even mathematical thinking fails?”
Indeed, the motto of Hilbert’s Consistency Program (“Wir mu¨ssen wissen—Wir werden
wissen” ) was engraved onto Hilbert’s tombstone 1.
Also, Go¨del was quite cautious (especially during the early 1930’s) not to speculate
whether all facets of Hilbert’s Consistency program would come to a termination. He
thus inserted the following cautious caveat into his famous 1931 millennial paper [19]:
∗∗ “It must be expressly noted that Theorem XI” (e.g. the Second Incompleteness
Theorem) “represents no contradiction of the formalistic standpoint of Hilbert. For
this standpoint presupposes only the existence of a consistency proof by finite means,
and there might conceivably be finite proofs which cannot be stated in P or in ... ”
Several biographies of Go¨del [8, 21, 74] have noted that Go¨del’s intention (prior to 1930)
was to establish Hilbert’s proposed objectives, before he formalized his famous result that
led in the opposite direction. For instance, Yourgrau’s biography [74] of Go¨del does record
how von Neumann, found it necessary during the early 1930’s to “argue against Go¨del
himself” about the definitive termination of Hilbert’s consistency program, which “for
several years” after [19]’s publication, Go¨del “was cautious not to prejudge”. It is known
that Go¨del had hinted that the Second Incompleteness Theorem was more significant
during a 1933 Vienna lecture [20]. (Go¨del has been recorded as having embraced the
1 English translation: “We must know: We will know.”
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Second Incompleteness Theorem quite broadly during the mid-1930’s after he learned
about Turing’s work [49].) Yet despite this endorsement, Gerald Sacks [43] has recalled
Go¨del telling him that some type of revival of Hilbert’s Consistency Program would be
feasible (see footnote 2 for the exact details that Sacks has provided.)
The research that has followed Go¨del’s seminal 1931 discovery has mainly focused on
studying generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem (instead of also examining
its boundary-case exceptions). Many of these generalizations of the Second Incomplete-
ness Theorem [2, 4, 7, 11, 16, 23, 24, 31, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 45, 46, 50, 51, 60, 61, 64, 66]
are quite beautiful. The author of this paper is especially impressed by a generalization of
the Second Incompleteness Effect, arrived at by the combined work of Pudla´k and Solovay
(abetted by the research of Nelson and Wilkie-Paris) [33, 39, 45, 51]. These results, which
also have been more recently discussed in [7, 22, 46, 60], have noted the Second Incom-
pleteness Theorem does not require the presence of the Principle of Induction to apply
to most formalisms that use a Hilbert-style form of deduction. (The next chapter will
offer a detailed summary of this important generalization of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem in its Remark 2.5.)
Our research, during the last 25 years has had a different focus, exploring Boundary-
Case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem more intensively than its gener-
alizations. It would be natural for many readers to ask why such exceptions should also
be studied, so intensively?
The reason is that while generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem are
very pure form a mathematical standpoint, it must not be forgotten that Mankind’s
survival in the future will require developing formalisms that own enough ingenuity to
solve a variety of pressing ecological problems, such as Global Warming, in a satisfactory
manner.
More specifically, the solution of mundane problems, threatening human survival, do
not require use of a formalism producing short proofs of the existence of large integers,
whose binary encodings employ more digits than the number of atoms in the universe.
It is, however, vital for mature logical formalisms to appreciate their own consistency,
2 Some quotes from Sacks’s YouTube talk [43] are that Go¨del “ did not think” the objectives of Hilbert’s
Consistency Program “were erased” by the Incompleteness Theorem, and Go¨del believed (according to
Sacks) it left Hilbert’s program “ very much alive and even more interesting than it initially was”.
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in at least a fragmentary sense, when they reason about the implications of their own
reasoning. (Otherwise, a Thinking Being, whether computerized or human, would not
be able to explain to itself fully why it is of foundational importance to study its own
thinking process, as a fundamental problem-solving facility.)
In particular, there is no doubt that a branch of mathematics, that makes it difficult to
manufacture abbreviated proofs of the existence of numbers as large as a google-plex (e.g.
22
100
), does fall short of the Utopian ideals that the intellectual community wishes for
Mathematics. We will argue, however, that the striking engineering needs that confront
modern Mankind requires the evolution of alternate formalisms, however theoretically
weak, for an adequate result to be obtained for many pressing issues.
In other words, we will contend that Hilbert and Go¨del were essentially correct when
their statements ∗ and ∗∗ suggested that a nihilistic approach, which ignores the engineering-
style capacities of weaker formalisms, that own a fragmented conception of their own con-
sistency, has serious short-comings. This is because the dangers of Global Warming and
other imminent threats that endanger 21-st century Mankind are too serious for logicians
to entertain using anything less than a formalism, which possesses at least a fragmentary
conception of its own consistency.
Also, we will discuss an addition to our prior research about self-justifying logics, called
Deductive Enrichment, which should convince skeptical readers that our formalisms
do indeed have practical value. Especially within a special context where modern com-
puters can perform arithmetic operations with more than a billion times the speed of a
human brain, we will argue our boundary-case exceptions to the prior century’s Second
Incompleteness Theorem have noteworthy pragmatic significance.
As the reader examines this paper, it should be kept in mind that all our self-justifying
axiom systems (since 1993) contain an ability to prove analogs of all the Π1 theorems of
Peano Arithmetic under a slightly revised language (such as §3’s L∗ formalism). This fact
is non-trivial because an axiom system that recognizes its own consistency will contain
little pragmatic significance, if it does not maintain an ability to prove all the quite central
Π1 theorems of Peano Arithmetic.
What will make our formalisms tempting in the current article is the new notion of
“Deductive Enrichment”. It will allow a formalism to maintain a simultaneous knowledge
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about its own consistency together with a recognition about the truth behind the Π1
theorems of Peano Arithmetic.
In particular, we do not dispute that our formalism will fall short of the Utopian
ideals for mathematics when it is unable to produce a brief proof for the existence of large
numbers, such as a google-plex (e.g. 22
100
). We do, however, claim our formalism contains
some pragmatic value when it owns a simultaneous knowledge about its own consistency
and the truth behind the Π1 theorems of Peano Arithmetic. (Moreover, we do encourage
the reader to examine, again, Go¨del’s caution about the Second Incompleteness Theorem,
which was observed by Sacks in [43] and has also been summarized by us in Footnote 2.)
2 General Notation and Literature Survey
Let us call an ordered pair (α, d) a “Generalized Arithmetic” when its first and second
components are defined as follows:
1. The Axiom Basis “ α ” of a Generalized Arithmetic will be defined as the set of
proper axioms it employs.
2. The second component “ d ” of a Generalized Arithmetic will be defined as the
combination of its formal rules of inference and the logical axioms “ Ld ” it em-
ploys. This second component, “ d ” of a Generalized Arithmetic will be called its
Deductive Apparatus.
Example 2.1 This notation allows us to conveniently separate the logical axioms
Ld , associated with (α, d) , from its “basis axioms” α . It also allows one to compare
the various deductive apparatus techniques that have appeared in the literature. For
instance, the dE apparatus, introduced in §2.4 of Enderton’s textbook [10], has used
only modus ponens as a rule of inference, combined with a complicated 4-part schema
of logical axioms. This differs from the dM , dH and dF approaches of Mendelson
[32], Ha´jek-Pudla´k [24] and Fitting [13]. The former two textbooks employ a simpler set
of logical axioms than dE , but they require two rules of inference (modus ponens and
generalization). The dF apparatus, appearing in Fitting’s textbook [13], as well as its
predecessor due to Smullyan [44], actually employ no logical axioms. Instead, Fitting
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and Smullyan rely upon a “tableaux style” method for generating a consequently larger
number of rules of inference.
Definition 2.2 Let α once again denote an axiom basis, and d designate a deduc-
tion apparatus. Then the ordered pair (α, d) will be called a Self Justifying configura-
tion when:
i one of (α, d)’s theorems (or possibly one of α’s axioms) do state that the deduction
method d, applied to the basis system α, produces a consistent set of theorems,
and
ii the axiom system α is in fact consistent.
Example 2.3 Using Definition 2.2’s notation, our prior research in [57, 60, 65, 66,
69, 71] has developed arithmetics (α, d) that were “Self Justifying”. It also proved
the Second Incompleteness Theorem implies specific limits beyond which self-justifying
formalisms cannot transgress. For any (α, d) , it is almost trivial to construct a system
αd ⊇ α that satisfies the Part-i condition (in an isolated context where the Part-ii
condition is not also satisfied). For instance, αd could consist of all of α ’s axioms plus
an added “SelfRef(α, d)” sentence, defined as stating:
⊕ There is no proof (using d’s deduction method) of 0 = 1 from the union
of the axiom system α with this sentence “SelfRef(α, d) ” (looking at itself).
Kleene discussed in [30] how to encode rough analogs of the above “I Am Consistent”
axiom statement. Each of Kleene, Rogers and Jeroslow [30, 42, 29], however, emphasized
that αd may be inconsistent (e.g. violating Part-ii of self-justification’s definition), despite
SelfRef(α, d)’s formalized assertion. This is because if the pair (α, d) is too strong then a
quite conventional Go¨del-style diagonalization argument can be applied to the axiom basis
of αd = α+ SelfRef(α, d), where the added presence of the statement SelfRef(α, d)
will cause this extended version of α , ironically, to become automatically inconsistent.
Thus, the encoding of “SelfRef(α, d)” is relatively easy, via an application of the Fixed
Point Theorem, but this sentence is often, ironically, entirely useless!
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Definition 2.4 Let Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z) denote two 3-way predicate sym-
bols specifying that x+y = z and x∗y = z (under Π1 styled-encodings for the associative,
commutative, identity and distributive principles using these two 3-way predicate sym-
bols). Let α denote what the first paragraph of this section had called an “axiom basis”.
We will then say that α recognizes successor, addition and multiplication as Total
Functions iff it can prove (1) - (3) as theorems.
∀x ∃z Add(x, 1, z) (1)
∀x ∀y ∃z Add(x, y, z) (2)
∀x ∀y ∃z Mult(x, y, z) (3)
Also, an axiom basis α will be called Type-M iff it includes (1) - (3) as theorems,
Type-A if it includes only (1) and (2) as theorems, and Type-S if it contains only (1)
as a theorem. Also, α is called Type-NS iff it can prove none of these theorems.
Remark 2.5 The separation of basis axiom systems into the four categories of Type-
NS, Type-S, Type-A and Type-M systems enables us to nicely summarize the prior liter-
ature about generalizations and boundary-case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness
Theorem. This is because:
a. The combined research of Pudla´k, Solovay, Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [33, 39, 45,
51], as is formalized by Theorem ++ , implies no natural Type-S generalized arith-
metic (α, d) can recognize its own consistency when d is one of Example 2.1’s three
examples of Hilbert-style deduction operators of dE , dH or dM . In particular, it
establishes the following result:
++ (Solovay’s modification [45] of Pudla´k [39]’s formalism using some of
Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [33, 51]’s methods) : Let (α, d) denote a gener-
alized arithmetic supporting the Line (1)’s Type-S statement and assuring
the successor operation will satisfy both x′ 6= 0 and x′ = y′ ⇔ x = y.
Then (α, d) cannot verify its own consistency whenever simultaneously d
is a Hilbert-style deductive apparatus and α treats addition and multipli-
cation as 3-way relations, satisfying their usual associative, commutative
distributive and identity axioms.
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Essentially, Solovay [45] privately communicated to us in 1994 an analog of theo-
rem ++. Many authors have noted Solovay has been reluctant to publish his nice
privately communicated results on many occasions [7, 24, 33, 36, 39, 51]. Thus,
approximate analogs of ++ were explored subsequently by Buss-Ignjatovic, Ha´jek
and Sˇvejdar in [7, 22, 46], as well as in Appendix A of our paper [60]. Also, Pudla´k’s
initial 1985 article [39] captured the majority of ++’s essence, chronologically before
Solovay’s observations. Also, Friedman did related work in [16].
b. Part of what makes ++ interesting is that [60, 65, 66, 72] explored two meth-
ods for generalized arithmetics to confirm their own consistency, whose natural
hybridizations are precluded by ++. Specifically, these results involve using Exam-
ple 2.3’s self-referencing “I am consistent” axiom (from its statement ⊕ ). They will
enable several Type-NS basis systems [60, 66, 72] to verify their own consistency
under a Hilbert-style deductive apparatus 3, or alternatively allow a Type-A system
[57, 60, 65, 67, 71] to corroborate its own self-consistency under a more restricted
semantic tableaux style deductive apparatus. Also, Willard [61, 68] observed how
one could refine ++ with Adamowicz-Zbierski’s methodology [1, 2] to show Type-M
systems cannot recognize their own tableaux-style consistency.
3 General Perspective
This section will explain how some seemingly minor hair-thin Boundary-Case exceptions
to the Second Incompleteness Theorem can be transformed into major chasms when one
contemplates the facts that 21-st century computers can perform arithmetic computations
with more than a billion times the speed of the human mind (with a similar accompanying
increase in the lengths of the logical sentences being manipulated). This distinction will
raise questions about whether 21-st century engineering projects will ultimately be forced
to encounter questions about the Second Incompleteness Theorem, which were ignored
when the scientific world had first learned about Go¨del’s work during the early 1930’s.
3 The Example 2.1’s provided three examples of Hilbert-style deduction operators, called dE , dH ,
and dM . It explained how these deductive operators differ from a tableaux-style deductive apparatus
by containing a modus ponens rule.
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3.1 Linguistic Notation
Our language for formalizing exceptions to the Second Incompleteness theorem will be
called L∗ . It will include the symbols C0 , C1 and C2 for representing the integers
of 0, 1 and 2. The language L∗ will formalize other non-negative integers using growth
function primitives and these three starting integers.
The only predicate symbols used by our language L∗ will be the equality and less-
than-or-equal predicates, denoted as “ = ” and “ ≤ ” . Sometimes, we will informally
also use the symbols ≥ , < and > .
Define F (a1, a2, ...aj) to be a NON-GROWTH FUNCTION iff for all values of
a1, a2, ...aj, the function F satisfies F (a1, a2, ...aj) ≤ Maximum(a1, a2, ...aj) . Our
axiom systems will employ a set of eight non-growth functions, called theGROUNDING
FUNCTIONS. They will include:
1. Integer Subtraction where x− y is defined to equal zero when x < y,
2. Integer Division where x
y
= x when y = 0 , and it otherwise equals ⌊ x
y
⌋ .
3. Predecessor(x) = Max( x− 1 , 0 ),
4. Maximum(x, y),
5. Logarithm(x) = ⌈Log2(x+ 1)⌉,
6. Root(x, y) = ⌊ x1/y ⌋ when y ≥ 1 , and Root(x, 0) = x.
7. Count(x, j) designating the number of “1” bits among x’s rightmost j bits.
8. Bit(x, i) designating the value of the integer x’s i−th rightmost bit. (Note that
Bit(x, i) = Count(x, i)− Count(x, i− 1).)
In addition to the above non-growth functions, our language L∗ will employ two
growth functions. They will correspond to Integer-Addition and Double(x) = x+ x. We
will use the term U-Grounding Function to refer to a function that is one of the eight
Grounding Functions or one of the operations of Addition and Doubling.
Comment 3.1 We do not technically need both the operations of Addition and Dou-
bling in our U-Grounding language L∗ . However, it much is easier to encode large integers
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when we have access to both these function symbols. For example, any integer N > 1
can be encoded by a term of length O( Log(N) ) , using only the constant symbol for “1”,
when both the addition and doubling function symbols are present. For instance, below
is our binary-like encoding for the number eleven.
1 + Double( 1 + Double( Double( 1))) (4)
Henceforth, the symbol N will denote such a binary-like encoding for the integer N .
(In the degenerate case where N = 0 , 0 will simply be defined as being the constant
symbol “ C0 ”, that represents zero’s value.)
Definition 3.2 We will follow mostly conventional logic notation when discussing
the U-Grounding functions. Thus, a term is defined to be a constant symbol, a variable
symbol or a function symbol (followed by some input arguments, which are similarly
defined terms). If t is a term then the quantifiers in ∀ v ≤ t Ψ(v) and ∃ v ≤ t Ψ(v)
will be called bounded quantifiers. These two wffs will be semantically equivalent to the
respective formulae of ∀v ( v ≤ t ⇒ Ψ(v)) and ∃v ( v ≤ t ∧ Ψ(v)). A formula Φ will
be called ∆∗0 iff all its quantifiers are bounded. Thus a ∆
∗
0 formula is defined to be a wff
that is any combination of atomic formulae (using our ten U-Grounding functions and
the equals and ≤ predicates) combined with bounded quantifiers and with the boolean
operations of AND,OR, NOT and IMPLIES in an arbitrary manner.
Definition 3.3 For any integer i ≥ 0 , this paragraph will define the notions of a
Π∗i and Σ
∗
i formula. Their definition has three parts, and it is given below.
1. Every ∆∗0 formula is defined to be also both a Π
∗
0 and Σ
∗
0 formula.
2. A formula is called Π∗i+1 iff for some Σ
∗
i formula Φ(v1, v2, ...vn), it can be written
in the form ∀v1 ∀v2 ... ∀vn Φ(v1, v2, ...vn) . (Since this rule also applies when the
number of quantifiers n equals zero, it follows that every Σ∗i formula is automatically
by default also Π∗i+1.)
3. Similarly, a formula is called Σ∗i+1 iff for some Π
∗
i formula Φ(v1, v2, ...vn), it can be
written in the form ∃v1 ∃v2 ... ∃vn Φ(v1, v2, ...vn) . (Since this rule applies when
the number of quantifiers n equals zero, it follows that every Π∗i formula is also
Σ∗i+1.)
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Example 3.4 Lines (5) are (6) are examples of Π∗2 sentences, and Lines (7) are (8)
are examples of Π∗1 sentences. Note that some Π
∗
2 sentences can be proven to be logically
equivalent to Π∗1 sentences. Thus for example, the sentences in Lines (5) and (8) are
equivalent to each other.
∀ x ∀ y ∃ z z − x = y (5)
∀ x ∀ y ∃ z x > 0 ⇒
z
x
= y (6)
∀ x ∀ y x+ y = y + x (7)
∀ x ∀ y ∃ z ≤ x+ y z − x = y (8)
Note that while Line (5)’s Π∗2 sentence can be transformed into an equivalent Π
∗
1 formula
(encoded by Line (8) ), there is no analogous Π∗1 sentence which is equivalent to Line (6).
(This is because Addition but not Multiplication belongs to our particular specified set of
U-Grounding functions.)
Remark 3.5 Throughout all our papers, the symbols Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z)
will denote two ∆∗0 formulae that are satisfied precisely when the respective conditions of
x+ y = z and x ∗ y = z are true. It turns out that we can define both these formulae
using only the non-growth functions of integer subtraction and division. Such definitions
of Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z) are provided by Lines (9) and (10) below
z − x = y ∧ z ≥ y (9)
[ (x = 0 ∨ y = 0)⇒ z = 0 ] ∧ [ (x 6= 0 ∧ y 6= 0 ) ⇒ (
z
x
= y ∧
z − 1
x
< y ) ] (10)
In this context, an axiom system α will be said to recognize Addition “as a total
function” iff it can prove
∀ x ∀ y ∃ z Add(x, y, z) (11)
Likewise, we will say an axiom system α can recognize Multiplication “as a total
function” iff it can prove
∀ x ∀ y ∃ z Mult(x, y, z) (12)
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Also, we will say an axiom system α can recognize “Successor” as a total function iff it
can prove:
∀ x ∃ z Add(x, 1, z) (13)
Some axiom systems α are unable to prove Multiplication is a total function, but
they can prove every true ∆∗0 sentence. Other axiom systems are unable to recognize
any of Addition, Multiplication or Successor as total functions, but they can still prove
every true ∆∗0 sentence. It will turn out these facts will be central to understanding the
generality and limitations of Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem.
Definition 3.6 A sentence Φ will be said to be written in Prenex* Normal Form
iff for some i ≥ 0 , it can be written as a Π∗i or a Σ
∗
i sentence. (It can be easily
established that a predicate logic, using the language L∗ , can show every sentence Φ
can be mapped onto a Prenex* sentence Φ∗ such that Φ ⇔ Φ∗. Thus without any
loss in generality, we may assume that all the proper axioms within a basis system α can
be encoded in a Prenex* normalized form.)
3.2 Enriched Forms of Tableaux Deduction
We will first employ our preceding language L∗ to review the definition of “Semantic
Tableaux” deduction in this section. We will then define two minor variations of this
construct, called the “Rank-Zero” and “Rank-Zero-Plus” enriched versions of Tableaux
deduction.
Our definition of a semantic tableaux proof will be similar to its counterparts in
Fitting’s and Smullyan’s textbooks [13, 44]. Define a Φ-Focused Candidate Tree for
the axiom system α to be a tree structure whose root corresponds to the sentence ¬Φ
and whose all other nodes are either formal axioms of α or deductions from higher nodes
of the tree. Let the notation “ A =⇒ B ” indicate B is a valid deduction when A is
an ancestor of B . In this notation, the deduction rules allowed in a candidate tree are:
1. Υ ∧ Γ =⇒ Υ and Υ ∧ Γ =⇒ Γ .
2. ¬¬Υ =⇒ Υ . Other Tableaux rules for the “¬ ” symbol are: ¬(Υ∨Γ) =⇒ ¬Υ∧¬Γ,
¬(Υ → Γ) =⇒ Υ ∧ ¬Γ , ¬(Υ ∧ Γ) =⇒ ¬Υ ∨ ¬Γ , ¬∃vΥ(v) =⇒ ∀v¬Υ(v) and
¬∀vΥ(v) =⇒ ∃v¬Υ(v)
11
3. A pair of sibling nodes Υ and Γ is allowed when their ancestor is Υ ∨ Γ .
4. A pair of sibling nodes ¬Υ and Γ is allowed when their ancestor is Υ → Γ.
5. ∃vΥ(v) =⇒ Υ(u) where u is a newly introduced “Parameter Symbol”.
6. Our variation of Rule 5 for bounded existential quantifiers of the form “ ∃v ≤ s ” is the
identity: ∃v ≤ s Υ(v) =⇒ u ≤ s ∧ Υ(u)
7. ∀vΥ(v) =⇒ Υ(t) where t denotes any U-Grounded term. These terms are defined to be
parameter symbols, constant symbols, or U-Grounding functions with recursively defined
inputs.
8. Our variation of Rule 7 for bounded universal quantifiers of the form “ ∀v ≤ s ” is the
identity: ∀v ≤ s Υ(v) =⇒ t ≤ s → Υ(t).
Define a particular leaf-to-root branch in a candidate tree T to be Closed iff it contains
both some sentence Υ and its negation ¬Υ . A Semantic Tableaux proof of Φ
will then be defined to be a candidate tree, all of whose root-to-leaf branches are closed,
such that the tree’s root stores the sentence ¬Φ and where all its other nodes are either
axioms of α or deductions from higher nodes.
Definition 3.7 Let Z denote an arbitrary set of sentences in our language L∗.
Recall that a node in a semantic tableaux deductive proof from an axiom system α is
allowed to include any axiom of α as one of its stored sentences. Such a proof will be
called a Z-Enriched proof if it may also include any version of (14)’s formalization of
the “Law of the Excluded Middle” as a permissible logical axiom for every Ψ ∈ Z .
Ψ ∨ ¬ Ψ (14)
It is well known that semantic tableaux proofs satisfy Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem
[13, 44]. This implies that the set of theorems that are proven from an axiom system α
via a conventional (unenriched) version of semantic tableaux deduction is the same as the
set of theorems proven from a Z-enriched version of this deductive mechanism. Our main
result in this section will show, however, that such proofs can have their efficiency often
exponentially shortened under such enrichments, where Line (14)’s schema is treated as
a set of logical axioms (rather than as a collection of derived theorems).
Definition 3.8 Let α be an arbitrary set of proper axioms and D denote a
deduction method. In this case, an arbitrary theorem Φ of α shall be said to satisfy
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a Ψ-Based Linear Constrained Cut Rule iff Φ ’s shortest proof from α (via D’s
apparatus) is guaranteed to be no longer than proportional to the sum of the lengths of
the proofs of Ψ and Ψ ⇒ Φ from α .
Example 3.9 All Hilbert-style deduction methods (including Example 2.1’s dE, dH ,
and dM Hilbert-style methodologies) employ Linear Constrained Cut Rules for any arbi-
trary input sentence Ψ (on account of the presence of their modus ponens rules). This
is the intuitive reason that Theorem ++ ’s generalization of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem (from Remark 2.5 ) applies to them. We will soon see that a similar generaliza-
tion of the Second Incompleteness Theorem applies to modifications of semantic tableaux
deduction (when Line (14)’s invocation of the Law of the Excluded Middle is available as
a logical axiom for every input sentence Ψ).
Lemma 3.10 Let DΨ denote an “enriched” deduction method, identical to semantic
tableaux deduction, except that Line (14)’s version of the Law of the Excluded Middle
is available as a logical axiom under DΨ . Then for an arbitrary theorem Φ, a Ψ-Based
Linear Constrained Cut Rule will be satisfied by the deduction method DΨ .
A Brief Sketched Justification: The germane proof p of Φ will follow the usual
semantic tableaux format by having its root store the sentence ¬ Φ . The child of this
root will then consist of Line (14)’s version of the Law of the Excluded Middle. Also,
the two children of this node will consist of the sentences of ¬Ψ and Ψ . We omit the
details, but it is easy to then verify that:
a. one may insert a proof-subtree below ¬Ψ that is no longer than linearly proportional
to the length of Ψ ’s proof.
b. one may insert a proof-subtree below Ψ that is no longer than linearly proportional
to the length of the proof of Ψ ⇒ Φ .
These constraints imply that the Ψ-Based Linear Constrained Cut Rule will be satisfied.
.
Definition 3.11 There will be several types of “Enrichments” of the semantic tableaux
deduction method that we will examine in the context of Definitions 3.7 and 3.8. These
will include:
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1. Infinitely Enriched formalisms that allow Line (14)’s variation of the “Law of
the Excluded Middle” to become a logical axiom, for any sentence Ψ from L∗ ’s
language.
2. Rank-k Enriched formalisms that allow Line (14)’s variation of the “Law of the
Excluded Middle” to be a logical axiom when Ψ is any Π∗k or Σ
∗
k sentence.
3. Rank-Zero Enriched formalisms that allow Line (14)’s variation of the “Law of
the Excluded Middle” to be a logical axiom when Ψ is any ∆∗0 sentence.
4. Rank-Zero-Plus Enriched formalisms that are a slightly stronger version of the
Rank-Zero formalism that take (15) as a logical axiom for any ∆∗0 formula ψ(x).
∀ x ψ(x) ∨ ¬ ψ(x) (15)
Remark 3.12 Let α denote any axiom basis that includes the ten U-Grounding
symbols. Then if D denotes the semantic tableaux deductive methodology and if all of
α’s axioms hold true in the standard model, it will follow that [65]’s ISD(α) formalism will
be a self-justifying system which proves all α’s Π∗1 theorems and additionally recognizes
its own semantic tableaux consistency. It turns out this result will also generalize when D
corresponds to either Item 3’s Rank-Zero enriched form of semantic tableaux deduction
or Item 4’s Rank-Zero-Plus enriched form. (E.g. these two systems will be also capable
of recognizing their own consistency under their enriched deduction methods.)
In contrast, one may easily apply Lemma 3.10 to show that the invariant ++ (appear-
ing in Remark 2.5) will generalize to establish that Type-S axiom systems cannot verify
their own consistency under infinite enrichments of the semantic tableaux 4. Indeed, the
methods from [64] imply the Second Incompleteness Theorem also generalizes for the case
of Rank-2 or higher enriched formalisms under Type-A arithmetics. Thus, there is only
a meaningful open question about the application of Remark 3.12’s paradigm to Rank-1
Enriched systems.
An attached appendix will review [65]’s definition of the ISD(α) axiom system, for
the benefit of those readers who have not read [65]. (It will amplify upon the claims
4This is because infinite enrichments of tableaux make its deductive procedure resemble Hilbert de-
duction because such enrichments uniformly obey Definition 3.8’s Linear Constrained Cut Rule. In
particular, these enrichments become inconsistent if they employ an analog of [65]’s Group-3 “I am
consistent” axioms
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made in the previous two paragraphs.) Our recommendation is that the reader postpone
examining this appendix until after the main sections of the current paper are finished.
This is because Definition 3.11’s notion of “Deductive Enrichment” is quite subtle, and
the next two sections shall need to first consider it in more detail.
4 The Significance of Deductive Enrichment
A general rule of thumb in Proof Theory is that an axiom system is typically extended
in order to expand the class of theorems it can prove. Since semantic tableaux deduction
satisfies Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem, the Definition 3.11’s four variations of deductive
enrichment will, however, not technically change the theorems that can be derived from
an initial base axiom system. Instead, the function of deductive enrichment will be to
improve the overall proof efficiency. (This is because an invoked version of the Law of
the Excluded Middle will shorten proof lengths when it is treated as a system of logical
axioms, rather than as a set of derived theorems.)
This issue was perhaps not so central in the early 20-th century when Go¨del announced
his initial 2-part Incompleteness paradigm. At that time, the only available medium of
thought was the Human Brain, which performed arithmetic computations at approxi-
mately a billion times a slower speed than that of the typical 21st century household
computer. Also, the potential lengths of logical sentences during the 1930’s was much
shorter than many potentially lengthy present-day computer-generated sentences.
Within the context of the longer expressions that computers can physically produce,
the task of separating true from false ∆∗0 sentences will likely become increasingly daunting
(assuming P 6= NP ), even when this task is technically decidable. Hence a Rank-Zero
Enrichment of a tableaux deductive formalism is a useful instrument, with the improved
efficiency of its Rank-Zero Linear Constrained Cut Rule. Moreover, the results from our
earlier paper [65] do trivially imply that our Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-Plus extensions of
Self-Justifying formalisms are guaranteed to be consistent. (This is because an application
of either the Rank-Zero or Rank-Zero-Plus versions of the Law of the Excluded Middle
can be formally encoded within a Π∗1 format, and the attached Appendix explains our
results from [65] imply that the addition of any set of logically valid Π∗1 sentences are
compatible with ISD(α) retaining its internal consistency.) In contrast, [64] implies the
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same is not true for Rank-2 and higher enrichments of tableaux deduction; e.g. these
formalisms lose their self-justification property when their enrichments are incorporated.
Remark 4.1 Many readers will be initially disappointed that Rank-2 and other higher
enrichments levels will be infeasible under self-justifying semantic tableaux deductive sys-
tems. This will mean that if Ψ denotes (16)’s declaration that multiplication is a total
function then neither can it be assumed to be true by our self-justifying formalisms, nor
can the theorem Ψ ∨ ¬Ψ be promoted into becoming a logical axiom (under the
self-justifying methods of ISD(α) without producing an inconsistency).
∀x ∀y ∃z Mult(x, y, z) (16)
Nevertheless, there is a method whereby our Rank-Zero Enriched formalisms can partially
formalize Line (16)’s meaning. Thus, let Ψk denote the ∆
∗
0 formula (shown below)
indicating that its localized version of multiplication is a total function among input
integers less than 2k .
∀x ≤ Doublek(2) ∀y ≤ Doublek(2) ∃z ≤ Double2k(2) Mult(x, y, z) (17)
Then it turns out that our Rank-Zero enriched versions of tableaux deduction can prove
Ψk as a theorem, as well as treat Ψk ∨ ¬Ψk as a logical axiom. We will call Ψk and
the logical axiom Ψk ∨ ¬Ψk the K-Localizations of the sentences Ψ and Ψ ∨ ¬Ψ .
In many pragmatic applications, one does not technically need Π∗j and Σ
∗
j theorems
Φ (with j ≥ 1): Instead, it suffices to prove a K-Localized theorem Φk, that employs
analogs of Line (17)’s three specified bounded quantifiers, for some sufficiently large fixed
constant k . In particular, a transition of higher sentences into ∆∗0 formulae is especially
pragmatic for 21st century computers, whose speed and allowed byte-lengths can exceed
by factors of many millions their counterparts produced by human mind.
Within such a context, the self-justifying capacities of even Rank-Zero Enriched forms
of Semantic tableaux deduction will be much more tempting during the 21st century than
they were at the time of Go¨del’s 1931 discovery (when computers were unavailable). It
is mainly for this reason that we suspect the modern world should not fully dismiss the
capacities of self-justifying logic formalisms.
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Moreover, we suspect that the futuristic civilization within our solar system, including
that on the planet Earth, may have no choice but to rely upon Self-Justifying computer-
ized logic systems. This is because many scientists (including the late physicist Stephen
Hawking) have speculated that if current trends continue, then Global Warming will cause
the planet Earth to become too hot for mammals to survive on it, within one or two cen-
turies. In such a context, where computers will not need the Earth’s cooler temperatures
and/or Oxygen to survive (e.g. see footnote 5 ), Stephen Hawking [25, 26] has predicted
that computers may become the main form of thinking agent during what will hopefully
be only a temporary period of Global Warming.
Such computers will need, presumably, to rely upon some form of Self-Justifying cogni-
tive process to organize the motivations of their thought processes. In particular, humans
seem to have relied upon some type of instinctive appreciation of the coherence of their
thought processes, as a prerequisite for motivating their cognitive process. Our suspicion
is that computers will need to imitate this self-reinforcing process.
Our conjecture is, thus, that the continuation of human civilization, within our Solar
System, may require computers taking temporary control of the larger part of its des-
tiny. More specifically, we suspect that a computer-and-robot technology shall be needed
to reverse Global Warming and enable a saved sample of frozen mammal embryos to
subsequently populate the planet Earth, again.
Some readers may shutter at the thought that planet Earth could become temporarily
uninhabitable during a perhaps thousand-year era of Global Over-Heating. This difficulty,
however, may actually amount to only be a temporary phenomena, if computers and
robots can restore Earth into a more hospitable environment after a period of several
thousand years (and also frozen human embryos are saved).
More precisely in a context where life has existed on Earth for approximately 4 billion
years, our perspective is that the danger posed by Global Warming would be tragic but
temporary, if robots and computers can reverse Global Warming after a period of a few
thousand years. In contrast, the implications of Global Warming would be much more se-
vere, if either it cannot be reversed or no frozen embryos are saved before Global Warming
5In particular, solar powered computers, physically residing outside the planet Earth, will need neither
Oxygen as an energy supply, nor have their operative functions being governed by the Earth’s temperature
(when they lie physically outside the planet’s domain).
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occurs. It is for this reason that we suggest it is imperative that a fleet of self-justifying
computers, along with accompanying robots and saved frozen embryos, be assembled as at
least a partial response to a potentially very serious Global Warming crisis. (See footnote
6 for some clarifications about the nature and limits of this proposal.)
5 On the Motivation for Writing this Paper
The author of this article has published several articles about generalizations and boundary-
case exceptions for Go´del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem [57]–[72], including six papers
that have appeared in the JSL and APAL. Unfortunately, the author has experienced both
a mild stroke and a mild heart attack during the summer of 2016.
These events did not prevent the author from continuing his teaching during 2017 and
2018. They did, however, cause a change in the specific goals of our research program. The
current article was intended, mostly, to encourage others to join this futuristic research
project. It has, thus, focused on explaining why this topic warrants further investigation.
This is subtle because our ISD(α) axiom system (formally defined in the Appendix)
has three disadvantages when D denotes semantic tableaux deduction. These drawbacks
are that:
1. ISD(α) is an unorthodox “Type-A” axiom system, which recognizes addition but not
also multiplication as a total function.
2. ISD(α) has employed a semantic tableaux deductive apparatus, that is substantially
less efficient than a more conventional Hilbert-styled deductive apparatus.
3. ISD(α) is able to recognize its consistency only by employing a version of Example
2.3’s self-referencing “I am consistent” axiom.
Our reply to Item 1 is that while ISD(α) is unconventional, it is not quite as weak as it
may first appear. This is partly because ISD(α) treats multiplication as a 3-way predicate
6 It is possible that if computer and robotics technologies do advance quickly enough than a tragic
Global Over-Heating can be completely avoided. Moreover, Steven Pinker discusses in [38] some tech-
nologies that could possibly eschew global warming. Our point is, however, that it would be wise to
also investigate the potential application of self-justifying formalisms because their use may be necessary
in the future for Earth’s mammals to survive and prosper. The Corollary A.3, in Appendix A, thus
illustrates a potential use of self-justifying computerized systems that possibly could be urgent.
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Mult(x, y, z), formalized by Line (10), rather than as a total function. Moreover, ISD(α)
can be easily arranged to prove all the Π1 theorems of Peano Arithmetic (except for
minor changes in notation) when its input axiom system α is made to correspond to
the trivial extension of Peano Arithmetic that includes our ten U-Grounding functions
symbols. While these adjustments may not be ideally Utopian, they are sufficient to reply
to the main difficulties raised by Item 1.
Our reply to Item 3 is also easy because the goal of ISD(α) IS NOT TO prove its own
consistency under the most challenging definition of a proof. Instead, it is to find an axiom
system that is comfortable with a built-in internal assumption about its own consistency
(via its physically built-in “I am consistent” axiom). Most conventional axiom systems do
not own extensions of themselves that can support even this task (due to various extensions
of the Second Incompleteness Theorem that preclude the consistency of such extensions).
Fortunately, ISD(α) is able to support this precious self-justification property when D
corresponds to either semantic tableaux deduction, or one of its refined Rank-Zero or
Rank-Zero-Plus enrichments.
Many readers will probably be especially leery of Item 2 because conventional Hilbert-
style deductive proofs satisfy Definition 3.8’s Linear Constrained Cut Rule, while Semantic
Tableaux Deduction does not obey this property. In particular, our ISD(α) formalisms
are required to treat the Law of the Excluded Middle as a set of derived theorems (rather
than as a formally stronger built-in schema of logical axioms). Such a constraint will
make our proofs substantially less efficient than a more ideal paradigm centered around
Definition 3.8’s Linear Constrained Cut Rule.
We can, fortunately, partially reply to this daunting challenge because Definition 3.11
indicated that there were four methods for enriching semantic tableaux deductive ma-
chineries. Two of these four methods (i.e. the Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-Plus enrich-
ments) are formally compatible with the existence of self-justifying extensions of their
semantic tableaux deductive machineries. Thus at least the Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-
Plus versions of the Law of the Excluded Middle may be incorporated into self-justifying
semantic tableaux formalisms.
Naturally, it would be better if Remark 3.12 indicated enrichment methodologies of
Rank-2 and higher were also compatible with self justification. Unfortunately, however,
excessive enrichments of the semantic tableaux deductive systems preclude self-justifying
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systems from existing (in a manner roughly analogous to how excessive enrichments of
Uranium Ore can cause nuclear reactors to become dangerously unstable). Thus, we are
currently confined to study of Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-Plus enrichments of semantic
tableaux, in a context where Rank-2 enrichments are infeasible, and Rank-1 enrichments
are a remaining open question. (See [64] for a discussion of Rank-2 enrichments.)
While one should not ignore the fact that only Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-Plus enrich-
ments of semantic tableaux deduction are known to be compatible with self justification,
it should be noted even such Rank-Zero enrichments are interesting. This is because one
can philosophically argue that a logical sentence loses its purely sensuous quality when
it employs unbounded quantifiers. Thus even Π∗1 and Σ
∗
1 sentences lie slightly above the
“touch-and-feel level” on account of their use of unbounded quantifiers. In other words,
our available ability to muster self-justifying Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-Plus enrichments
of semantic tableaux deduction is significant because this level of enrichment is broad
enough to include the crucial “touch-and-feel” sentences of the language L∗.
The preceding point is important because it allows us to summarize both the strengths
and weaknesses of Go¨del’s 1931 Second Incompleteness Theorem. Thus, the traditional
literature has been certainly correct in viewing Go¨del’s discovery as a seminal result,
when our boundary-case exceptions to it have persisted at only the Rank-Zero and Rank-
Zero-Plus enrichment levels. On the other hand, the existence of such enrichments show
that Go¨del and Hilbert were partially correct when their statements ∗ and ∗∗ foresaw
that some types of exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Effect would persist (e.g. see
§1 ). Moreover, the study of how to efficiently process ∆∗0 sentences is important both
because of their “touch-and-feel” property and because it will be challenging to process
these sentences efficiently, assuming that P 6= NP .
Moreover, we remind the reader that Stephen Hawking and other scientists have
expressed concern that Global Warming could possibly lead to, at least, a temporary
era where digital computers replace human brains as the primary economically efficient
mechanism for generating thoughts [25, 26]. In a context where computers can generate
thoughts more than a billion times faster than the human mind, the preceding chap-
ter suggested that a self-justifying formalism, using only Rank-Zero and Rank-Zero-Plus
enrichments of semantic tableaux, could help computers function more efficiently.
In particular, our fervent hope is that humans will continue to be important and central
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in the future. It is likely that computerized simulations of the human thought process
will be also important, even if Global Warming occurs as, hopefully, a very temporary
phenomena.
The writing of this section has been certainly a painful task because it conveys a
message that is an awkward mixture of insight, hope and humbling realization. Thus,
the fundamental insight, appearing herein, is that some types of borderline exceptions to
the Second Incompleteness Theorem are noteworthy because their logical formalisms can
retain at least some type of partial internalized appreciation of their own consistency. The
then-accompanying hope is that computers can use this knowledge to help life on Earth
survive Global Warming and other futuristic challenges. And finally our humbling, albeit
partially optimistic, conclusion is that a prosperous life can continue on planet Earth if
(?) and when humans share with computers a joint control over our future destiny. (We
wish we could offer here a more positive conclusion, but this section has offered at least
a partially optimistic message).
6 Extending Our Main Thesis
Each of §1-5 had appeared in an earlier July 2018 version of our Cornell Archives technical
report. They had subsequently undergone only very minor revisions editorial revisions.
In contrast, this additional chapter is new. Its goal will be to show that self-justifying
arithmetics will have quite significant implications, even if Global Warming does not occur.
6.1 Background Setting
Our prior research during the last 25 years had received a positive reception. It thus
generated six sole-authored papers in the JSL and APAL.
At the same time, the logic community had also treated our work with certainly some
guarded caution. This is because we documented only the existence of boundary case
exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem. More specifically, there can be no
disputing that the Second Incompleteness Theorem has shown that at least roughly 97 %
of the initial goals of Hilbert’s Consistency Program were simply infeasible.
The significance of the prior sections of this report is that they have shown how a
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nontrivial final 3 % of the implications of the Second Incompleteness Theorem should be
further investigated. This is because one cannot doubt that Global Warming is a certainly
potentially major threat. We thus observed how self-justifying arithmetics can represent,
at least, a fractional 7 part of a solution to the Global Warming dilemma.
Most scientists suspect that Global Warming is a real threat, but we shall not include
such an assumption within this chapter. Instead, we will focus on the famous interstel-
lar paradox that was posed by Enrico Fermi during a 1950 luncheon at the Los Alamos
National Laboratories [12]. We will show that self-justifying arithmetics are equally im-
portant within the context of the perplexing Fermi Paradox.
6.2 The Fermi Paradox
The Fermi Paradox [12] has been nicely summarized in Wikipedia as highlighting the
essential contrast between arguments showing the scale and probability of the existence
of intelligent life being common in the universe versus the total lack of evidence of life as
arising anywhere outside Earth.
Many logicians would probably prefer Fermi’s open question to be called a “Mystery”
or an “Unsettled Question” because it does not quite amount to being a “Paradox”, as
logicians commonly use this term.
In particular, Wikipedia estimates it would take a civilization no more than roughly
“5-50”’ million years to colonize a quite substantial number of Earth-like planets in the
Milky Way (once and if (?) life reaches planet Earth’s 21-st century stage of civilization
and continues to survive). This is because even if life takes approximately R years to
spread from one star system X to another system, called say “Y”, then it should be able
to multiply throughout the Milky Way’s no more than its approximately 4 · 1011 possible
life supporting star systems in roughly R · Log210
12 years. (E.g. there should be needed
no more than 40 cycles of doublings of the population of civilized stars until the majority
of such stars become life supporting.)
In other words, if R was even the relatively large number of 105 years, then only 4 ·106
7Obviously, many other technologies will be needed, along with Symbolic Logic, to alleviate Global
Warming. They will include a more sophisticated understanding of robotics, artificial intelligence, the
cognitive sciences, the ability to engage in space travel and to better engineer biological systems. Our
point, here, is only that a more sophisticated understanding of Self-Justifying logics will be one part of
a much broader solution to the threat of Global Warming.
22
years would be sufficient for civilization to spread to a great number Earth-like planets
in the Milky Way (when only 40 doublings are sufficient to colonize the entire galaxy’s
collection of life-supporting stars under a reasonable approximation of the exponential
growth associated with what should perhaps be called the “Fermi Exponential Fertilization
Paradigm”). On the other hand, a slightly larger 4 ·107 years will be needed if, say, R = 106
years.
Fermi asked the question about why such a colonization has not already occurred
in the Milky Way when many stars much older than the Sun are known to exist, and
5 or 50 million years is a relatively small amount of time (compared to the age of the
Milky Way). We will not delve into this question here because it is complicated. (It
includes the possibility that all the predecessors to Earth’s civilization have been unable to
preclude their own self-destruction. It also allows for the possibility that some enlightened
civilization will ultimately find a more amicable outcome.)
Our point is that this topic will intersect, eventually, with one’s interest about the
long-range implications of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This is because the time
delay between communications among distant stars will, presumably, tempt an evolving
civilization to ultimately use a common computerized algorithm (rather than to deploy
time-delayed radio signals as a medium to communicate a common logical formalism
among distant star systems).
Thus while the Second Incompleteness Theorem’s prohibition against a formalism
owning an ideally robust appreciation of its own consistency is a very serious obstacle,
some type of possibly fragmented understanding of one’s self consistency will probably be
necessary, if a civilization within our galaxy can survive the challenges that time thrusts
upon it (irregardless of whether or not Global Warming shall occur).
In other words, this chapter has reinforced the theme of the prior section, without
assuming the existence of a Global Warming threat. Thus while the Second Incompleteness
Theorem and its various generalizations do show that at least 97 % of the initial goals of
Hilbert’s Consistency Program were infeasible, some diluted version of Hilbert’s program
will likely be necessary for the long-range futuristic survival of an on-going civilization.
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7 Overall Perspective
It should be noted that we have described an alternate version of self-justifying arithmetics
in [72] that are Type-NS systems that use a Hilbert-style deductive apparatus, instead of
a semantic tableaux deductive apparatus. These systems will be required to replace the
assumption that addition is a total function with [72]’s alternate weaker growth primitive,
called the θ operator, so that its systems may remain consistent. We have not discussed
[72]’s results here because these logics have relied upon a conjecture we consider likely,
although it currently is an unproven hypothesis,
We are uncertain which of our main results in this article or in [72] are preferable.
Our overall perspective is that the threat of global warming, combined with the additional
long-term issues associated with the Fermi Paradox, will make it inevitable for an evolving
cognitive community to contemplate with increased seriousness the implications of some
type of partial evasions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
Especially in the context where I have experienced a mild stroke and a mild heart
attack during 2016, I am eager to encourage other researchers join us in this on-going
futuristic research project.
As has been already noted, the writing of this article has been a quite painful expe-
rience because it is disconcerting to consider a future where humans may be required to
share with computers a joint control over our collective destiny. Yet, there appears to
be no viable long-term alternative for the human race’s survival. The good news is that
a wisely controlled human-computer interaction can preserve at least the main spirit of
what humans are trying to accomplish
Additional Remark: This paper has been written as an “extended abstract”, rather
than as a fully detailed exposition, primarily because many of our other papers have
discussed related topics in much greater detail. The writing style of an informal extended
abstract also seemed preferable because our chief goal has been to stimulate a larger
community of researchers to join us in an ambitious project, centered around futuristic
self-justifying logic systems.
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8 About the Author and the Broader Impact of this
Research
In addition to publishing several papers about symbolic logic, Dan Willard has been also
active in several other areas of research. This other activity has included:
A. Co-Authoring with Robert Trivers [48, 73] a hypothesis that Darwinian evolution
exercises partial control over the sex determination of offspring. Google Scholar
has recorded 3,648 citations to the TW article [48], as of November 6, 2018. The
significance of the TW Hypothesis was also mentioned twice in the New York Times
on February 17, 1981 and on January 21, 2017 in articles entitled “Species Survival
Linked to Lopsided Sex Ratios” and “Does Breast Milk Have A Sex Bias”. (More-
over, Trivers has cleared up a possibly awkward statement, he has made, when page
113 in his recent book [47] does state the seminal idea behind the Trivers-Willard
Hypothesis was fundamentally due 8 to Dan Willard’s initial observations.)
B. Co-Authoring with Michael Fredman the articles [14, 15] about Sorting and Search-
ing. These papers were the chronologically first among six items mentioned in the
“Mathematics and Computer Science Section” of the 1991 Annual Report of the Na-
tional Science Foundation. (The prominence of Fusion Trees was also signaled by
the facts that they are the topic of Lecture 12 in MIT’s Advanced Data Structures
course, taught by its famous MacArthur-award winning professor Eric Demaine (dis-
seminated over YouTube [9]), and also the topic of the Lecture 2 in Harvard’s course
Compsci 224 (recorded on YouTube by Harvard’s Prof. Jelani Nelson [34].)
C. Developing the Y-Fast Trie data structure [53], the Down Pointer Method [54] and
many other results germane to Computational Geometry, Advanced Data Structures
and Relational Database Optimization Theory [52, 55, 56, 58, 62].
The reason we have mentioned Items A-C here is that we are aware that Willard’s pre-
diction that Self-Justifying axiom systems could possibly alleviate the Global Warming
crisis will likely be seen as controversial. This is because the human personality, which is
8 The exact quote appearing on Page 113 in Bob Trivers’s book [47] is the frank statement that if
he “wanted to divide up credit” exactly between Trivers and Willard, the closing sentence of [48] should
have declared that “The idea was Dan’s; the exposition Bob’s”, rather than the passage that was written.
partially a product of Darwinian Evolution, is biased and uncomfortable with the idea of
computers sharing with humans a knowledge of one’s own self-consistency. (Such knowl-
edge implies an uncomfortably awkward shared control over our joint future destinies,
between computers and mankind.)
Our hope is that the momentum established from our previous research will add cred-
ibility to this paper’s awkward but quite realistic predictions. We hope this will make
a larger audience recognize the provocative need for artificially intelligent computers to
share with humans a temporary control over the planet Earth’s destiny until it recovers
from a global warming crisis. We suspect this will be necessary for planet Earth to become
more hospitable for human civilization’s vibrant and continuing survival.
Thus, the purpose of Items A-C was not to boast or brag. Instead, it was to tempt our
readers to realize that a new step may be needed for civilization and humans to continue
to peacefully thrive on Earth, under the shadow of a Global Warming’s pending threat 9.
Thus in a context where the majority of readers are likely to be understandably concerned
about a World where computers might share equal power with humans over our collective
destiny, we hope the prior success of our projects, A and B, together with the alarming
shadow of a likely upcoming Global Warming threat and the prospects of a troubling
Fermi Paradox, will help our readers to gain a renewed optimism and hope about what
shall be, possibly, the final necessary step for the sake of the human spirit’s continuing
and thriving survival.
In essence the classic interpretation, where the Second Incompleteness Theorem has
been seen as refuting roughly 95-98 % of the initial objectives of Hilbert’s Consistency
Program, is basicly correct — except for the fact that it has ignored a quite crucial point
about how 21st and 22nd century logics shall have very different goals than those that
were envisioned, initially, during the first half of the 20th century.
Acknowledgment: I thank Seth Chaiken for several comments about how to improve
the style of presentation.
9 This step will require, of course, much more than the evolution of self-justifying arithmetics. It
will also require advances in robotics, space travel, biology, the cognitive sciences, and AI-like heuristic
optimizing methods. We suspect a conjecture we made about [72]’s special θ function will turn out to be
also useful in this endevour.
26
Appendix
Our article [65] had introduced both the definitions of the ISD(α) axiom system and of a
formalism owning a “Level(J) Appreciation” of its own consistency. This appendix will
review the definitions of these two concepts, as well as explain how they are related to
enriched versions of semantic tableaux deduction. This appendix should be read only
after Sections 1-5 are completed
During our discussion, L∗ will denote the language defined in §3.1, and β will denote
a basis axiom system whose deductive apparatus is denoted as D. In this context, the
basis system β will be said to own:
1. a Level(n) Appreciation of its own consistency under D’s deductive apparatus
iff β can prove that there exists no Π∗n sentence Υ such that (β,D) supports
simultaneous proofs of both Υ and ¬Υ.
2. a Level(0-) Appreciation of its own consistency under D’s deductive apparatus
iff it can prove there exists no proof of 0=1 from the (β,D) formalism
All these definitions of consistency, from Level(0-) up to Level(n), are equivalent to each
other under strong enough models of Arithmetic. However, many weak axiom systems do
not possess the mathematical strength to recognize their equivalence.
In particular, an axiom system β owning a Level(1) appreciation of its own consis-
tency is much stronger than such a system possessing a Level(0-) appreciation of its own
consistency. This is because Level(1) systems can use a proof of a Π∗1 theorem Υ to gain
the practical knowledge that no proof of ¬Υ exists.
In a context where α is essentially any axiom system that employs L∗ ’s language
and where D denotes any deductive apparatus, our axiom system ISD(α) in [65] was
designed to achieve two specific goals. These were:
1. To prove all true ∆∗0 sentences, as well as to prove all the Π
∗
1 theorems that are
implied by the axiom basis α . In particular, the formal definition of ISD(α)
system, in §3 of [65], accomplished the first task trivially via its “Group-Zero” and
“Group-1 schema”. It performed the second task because its “Group-2 scheme”
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employed Line (18)’s particular generic structure for each Π∗1 sentence Φ (e.g. see
Footnote 10 ).
∀ p { Prf β( ⌈Φ ⌉ , p ) → Φ } (18)
2. To “formally recognize” its own Level-1 consistency under D’s deductive apparatus.
This was accomplished by having ISD(α)’s “Group-3” axiom formalize a Π
∗
1 sentence
that amounts to (19)’s statement. (The symbol “Pair(x, y)” in Line (19) is a ∆∗0
formula indicating that x is the Go¨del number of a Π∗1 sentence and that y
represents x ’s “mechanically 11 formalized negation”. Also, Prf ISD(α)(a, b) in
(19) denotes a ∆∗0 formula indicating that b is a proof, using the deduction method
D , of the theorem a from the axiom system ISD(α).) The nice aspect of (19)
is that ISD(α) can unambiguously interpret the meaning of its three ∆
∗
0 formulae
because its Group-Zero and Group-1 schema allow it to correctly decipher Line
(19)’s statement.
∀ x ∀ y ∀ p ∀ q ¬ [ Pair(x, y) ∧ Prf ISD(α)(x, p) ∧ Prf ISD(α)(y, q) ] (19)
Remark A.1 It is unnecessary to provide a formal description of the axiom system
ISD(α) here because §3 of [65] already explained how it (and especially Line (19) ) can be
exactly encoded. There are two clarifications relevant to ISD(α)’s definition that should,
however, be mentioned.
a. Our ISD(α) axiom system is a well defined entity for any deductive apparatus D
and for any axiom basis system α (that have recursively enumerable formal struc-
tures). Since Line (19) is a self-referencing sentence, one needs some meticulous care,
however, to assure that the Fixed Point Theorem can encode a Π∗1 sentence that is
equivalent to Line (19)’s statement. (We do not discuss this topic here because it
was discussed in adequate detail in [65]. )
b. Although the ISD(α) axiom system is well-defined entity for all inputs D and α ,
this fact does not also guarantee that ISD(α) is consistent. Indeed, the Second
Incompleteness Theorem implies ISD(α) is inconsistent for most inputs D and α .
10The symbol ⌈Φ ⌉ in (18) denotes Φ ’s Go¨del number, and the symbol Prf β( ⌈Φ ⌉ , p ) will
designate a ∆∗
0
formula stating that p is a proof of Φ.
11In particular, if x is the Go¨del number of a Π1 sentence Φ then its “mechanically formalized
negation” y is the Go¨del number for “ ¬ Φ ”.
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This issue was previously visited by us in Example 2.3. It had emphasized that
“I am consistent” axioms, similar to Line (19), can be easily encoded (via the Fixed
Point theorem). However, these axiom sentences are typically useless, on account of
the inconsistencies that they usually produce.
Our main result in [65] is related to Item (b)’s ironical paradigm. In particular, [65]
established that Remark A.1.b’s paradigm can be evaded when D corresponds to semantic
tableaux deduction. Thus, [63, 65] established that the following partial boundary case
exception to the Second Incompleteness Theorem does arise:
Theorem A.2. [63, 65] Let DS denote the semantic tableaux deductive apparatus,
and α denote any axiom system all of whose Π∗1 theorems are true sentences under the
standard model using the language L∗ . Then ISDS(α) will prove all α’s Π
∗
1 theorems,
and it will also be consistent.
We remind the reader that Theorem A.2 is significant because the Second Incom-
pleteness Theorems implies that most systems, formally verifying their own consistency,
actually fail to be consistent. Theorem A.2 is germane to the current article because it
implies the following corollary:
Corollary A.3 Let DE denote the Rank-Zero-Plus enrichment of the semantic
tableaux apparatus. Also, let α again denote an axiom system all of whose Π∗1 the-
orems are true sentences under the standard model. Then ISDE(α) will also be consistent.
Corollary A.3 is an easy consequence of Theorem A.2. We will now present a brief
sketch of its proof.
Proof Outline: Let α∗ denote the extension of the basis system α that includes one
instance of axiom (20) for every ∆∗0 formula Ψ(x) .
∀ x Ψ(x) ∨ ¬ Ψ(x) (20)
Theorem A.2 implies that all the theorems of α∗ hold true under the standard model
simply because (20) holds true under the Standard Model, as do also all the particular
Π∗1 theorems of α. Hence, Theorem A.2 implies that ISDS(α
∗) is consistent. This implies
that ISDE(α) must also be consistent (since the ISDS(α
∗) and ISDE(α) formalisms are
essentially identical to each other, except for minor changes in notation). 
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Remark A.4. The simplicity of Corollary A.3’s proof may tempt one to partially
overlook its significance. This corollary is significant because one of the main themes
of our article has been that a deductive apparatus does not capture the core intentions
of most logics, unless it contains some form of Definition 3.8’s Linear Constrained Cut
Rule. The significance of Corollary A.3 is that it shows that the Rank-Zero-Plus variant of
Definition 3.8’s linear cut rule is actually formally supported by the self-justifying ISDE(α)
axiom system.
Remark A.5. We again remind the reader that the formalism ISDS(α) and ISDE(α)
in Propositions A.2 and A.3 are capable of proving all Peano Arithmetic’s Π∗1 theorems
when α designates the trivial extension of Peano Arithmetic which includes the ten
U-Grounding functions symbols. (These self-justifying formalisms can thus appreciate a
non-trivial part of Engineering’s Π1 significance for traditional arithmetics.)
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